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Abstract 
With its “credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU enlargement with the 
Western Balkans”, the EU plans to launch several new flagship initiatives for the six aspiring 
countries. The key initiative envisaged is “to strengthen rule of law” through more detailed 
assessment of the rule of law and reform implementation by including case-based peer 
reviews, trial monitoring of serious corruption cases and organised crime, developing 
indicators for reform implementation and deploying advisory missions. 
The EU has begun some planning but detailed action plans are yet to come. New programmes 
and initiatives should be new in content and form. In the case of Kosovo, things are more 
complex; the clarity of the new plan and drawing the line between the past and future is key 
for any success of the upcoming initiatives. With EULEX still on the ground, after 10 years of 
deployment, plagued by low trust and an image of failure, the rule of law has little improved 
in Kosovo. The EU should carefully consider the conditions upon which new initiatives are 
established.  
Equally, local authorities need to be fully in the driving seat. Reluctant to do so until now, the 
government has recently initiated a Functional Review of the Rule of Law Sector and Justice 
2020. Their agendas have not progressed much in the absence of political will, and undefined 
roles and agendas remain between the local authorities and EU.  
Any new initiatives should be launched based on certain principles that ensure they have full 
local ownership, are driven by local demand, are based on in-depth evaluation and 
verification, build upon broad consultations and inclusion, have a clearly defined role and 
scope, have realistic expectations and contribute to streamlining the reform agendas.  
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Executive summary 
The EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), deployed in late 2008, should not only phase 
out but also go home; the mission has achieved limited success and its reputation has 
become questionable. Complex relations and incompatible agendas and interests between 
the local authorities and EULEX have failed to improve the rule of law in Kosovo. With EULEX 
set to depart, Kosovo institutions need to take the leading role. Citizens want to keep their 
government accountable.  
The European Commission’s “credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU 
enlargement with the Western Balkans” envisages launching several flagship initiatives, the 
key one being on the rule of law.1 The initiatives to strengthen the rule of law help to assess 
reform implementation, including through developing impact indicators, trial monitoring, 
case-based peer-review missions and new advisory missions. EULEX has undertaken many of 
these activities in addition to its executive power. Yet, Kosovo’s rule of law and judiciary 
remain weak, plagued by incompetence, corruption and political interference, with very little 
public trust.  
With dozens of projects and initiatives in place through the EU, member states, the US and 
other donors, new flagship initiatives should not be a duplication of EULEX or Instrument for 
Pre-Accession Assistance projects. Important lessons should be drawn and all projects should 
be driven by local demand. With the goal to achieve ‘societal transformation’ in the area of 
the rule of law, the new initiatives have to be launched on the basis of a comprehensive 
assessment and certain principles that would ensure a feasible impact:  
• No role for EULEX or its structures should be envisaged in assessing, planning or 
implementing other initiatives. 
• An independent expert evaluation and verification mission should fairly evaluate the 
state of the rule of law and needs for improvement.  
• New projects need to be demand-driven and ensure full local ownership. 
• To increase the chance of success any new initiative should earn much broader local 
support, with in-depth consultations with civil society and citizens’ groups. 
• Advisory or support missions within the country need to have a clearly defined role 
and scope.  
• New projects and agendas should contribute to streamlining reform processes. 
• Framing the expectations of any new initiative within the country and communicating 
with the wider public is key for success and earning public trust.  
                                                     
1 For more, see the full document at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-
credible-enlargement-perspective-western-balkans_en.pdf. 
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1. Introduction 
Ten years after the establishment of the EU’s Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo in 2008, 
the European Council approved EULEX’s fifth and likely final mandate. Also in 2018, the 
European Commission unveiled plans for a new rule of law flagship initiative in its 
enlargement strategy for the Western Balkans.2 With EULEX being phased out and the 
Commission’s flagship initiative still undefined, Kosovo’s rule of law institutions are entering a 
period of transition and uncertain relations with the international community. 
EULEX achieved some progress in policing, customs and strengthening Kosovo’s legal 
framework. Yet, very few, including EULEX personnel and EU officials, would hail the mission 
as a success. Kosovo citizens had welcomed EULEX at the outset, hoping that it would catch 
the ‘big fish’, combat high-level corruption and organised crime, strengthen judicial 
independence, and bring Kosovo closer to the EU. Ten years later, however, EULEX has a poor 
track record in all areas of its work. Some internationally pushed reforms have brought 
Kosovo’s justice system closer in line with EU standards on paper but have had limited 
practical effect. 
The Kosovo Ministry of Justice has recently launched two large initiatives, the Functional 
Review of the Rule of Law Sector and Justice 2020, with the goal to support and coordinate 
rule of law and judicial assessment and reform. Still, rule of law institutions must move 
beyond ribbon-cutting to demonstrate effectiveness and capacity to meet both local 
objectives and EU requirements, improve inter-agency coordination and assume full local 
ownership for reform. Kosovo’s rule of law institutions and the EU should adopt a post-EULEX 
strategy, which takes into consideration past experiences, lessons learned, mistakes in 
shaping a locally-owned rule of law landscape, and how the rule of law can be supported by 
the international community moving forward.  
Rule of law and judicial reforms are driven by two complementary objectives, a state-building 
agenda and EU membership. First, as a new country, Kosovo has to move faster in 
establishing the rule of law, a cornerstone of any democratic state. Second, aiming to join the 
EU, Kosovo has committed to a number of EU integration processes requiring reforms to the 
rule of law, including the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), European Reform 
Agenda (ERA) and visa-liberalisation criteria.  
The box-ticking approach that has accompanied Kosovo’s ERA and EULEX’s desire for a 
successful legacy has often undermined the normative goal of developing independent and 
effective rule of law and judicial institutions in the country. Yet moving forward, particularly in 
light of the internal rule of law challenges faced by a number of EU member states, the EU will 
require prospective members to fulfil additional, measurable benchmarks and to demonstrate 
                                                     
2 The rule of law flagship initiatives will expand existing and alternative assistance tools and introduce new 
support mechanisms, including rule of law advisory missions and case-based peer-review missions as well as trial 
monitoring and the development of detailed action plans and indicators.  
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genuine ‘societal transformation’ in the area of the rule of law.3 Domestic rule of law 
institutions have to move beyond superficial, ad hoc reforms to focus on developing a 
comprehensive approach that supports ‘cultural transformation of the judiciary’ and 
independent justice sector institutions that can implement fundamental reforms in line with 
European standards.  
This policy brief evaluates the state of the rule of law under EULEX’s mandate, draws lessons 
and identifies a number of preconditions for improving the rule of law and judicial 
development in Kosovo under the EU’s planned rule of law flagship initiative and support 
mechanisms. As EULEX prepares to fully dismantle, Kosovo’s government and rule of law 
institutions must take action now to steer rule of law and judicial reform, while collaborating 
early on with EU institutions to determine the implementation plan for the rule of law flagship 
initiatives.  
2. A short overview of EULEX 
In late 2008, EULEX deployed as a monitoring, mentoring and advising (MMA) mission with 
additional judicial and security-related executive functions,4 which allowed EULEX police and 
prosecutors to independently investigate and prosecute cases and granted EULEX judges final 
                                                     
3 European Commission (2018). “A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the 
Western Balkans.” Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2018) 65 final, 6 February; see 
Hoxhaj, Andi (2018). “The New EU Rule of Law Initiative for the Western Balkans.” Conference Papers: Rule of 
Law in the Western Balkans: Exploring the New EU Enlargement Strategy and Necessary Steps Ahead. April 2018. 
Aspen Institute Germany; see also Elbasani, Arolda (2018). “International Promotion of Rule of Law: Facing 
Connections between Patronage, Crime, and Judiciary Corruption.” Conference Papers: Rule of Law in the 
Western Balkans: Exploring the New EU Enlargement Strategy and Necessary Steps Ahead. Aspen Institute 
Germany, April.  
4 See Council of the European Union (2008). Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP on the European Union Rule of 
Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX Kosovo, 4 February. In line with the MMA pillar of EULEX’s mandate, the mission 
assumed the following tasks: (i) helping to eliminate political interference; (ii) ensuring proper investigation, 
prosecution, adjudication, and enforcement of serious crimes; (iii) enhancing coordination throughout the 
judicial process, particularly with regard to organised crime; (iv) supporting the fight against financial crime and 
corruption; and (v) contributing to the implementation of the Kosovo Anti-Corruption Strategy and Anti-
Corruption Action Plan (2008 Council Joint Action). EULEX’s executive functions were concentrated on the 
judiciary, particularly with regard to investigating and prosecuting ‘serious crimes’ including war crimes, 
terrorism, organised crime and corruption, interethnic crimes, and financial crimes. While EULEX also played an 
MMA role in this regard, international investigators, prosecutors and judges served in executive roles, working 
“jointly with Kosovo investigators, prosecutors, and judges or independently” to address serious crimes, and also 
assumed the authority to create “cooperation and coordination structures between police and prosecution 
authorities”. In line with Kosovo’s Law No. 03/L-053 on jurisdiction, case selection and case allocation of EULEX 
Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo, EULEX judges formed the majority (two-thirds) on court panels. EULEX also 
had some security-related executive responsibilities, with the authority to “ensure the maintenance and 
promotion of rule of law, public order, and security … as necessary … through reversing or annulling operations 
decisions taken by the competent Kosovo authorities”. EULEX was also authorised to “assume other 
responsibilities, independently or in support of the competent Kosovo authorities” in the name of ‘rule of law, 
public order, and security’. 
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authority over cases under their purview.5 Initially comprised of over 3,000 police officers, 
judges, prosecutors and administrative personnel and with an initial 16-month budget of 
€205 million, EULEX was the largest civilian mission ever launched under the European 
security and defence policy.6 Its mandate was extended in 2010 and again in 2012, by which 
time the EU had committed €614 million for EULEX operations.7 In 2012, the mission was 
downsized (losing around a quarter of its personnel) and slightly restructured, with the 
‘Executive Division’ managing the executive responsibilities and ‘Strengthening Division’ 
overseeing EULEX’s MMA functions.8 The exchange of letters between Kosovo President 
Atifete Jahjaga and EU High Representative Catherine Ashton paved the way for the renewal 
of the EULEX mandate in 2014, which limited the mission’s executive functions (local judges 
would subsequently form the majority on court panels and EULEX would not take on new 
cases with the exception of those pertaining to the north of Kosovo) and tasked EULEX with 
assisting the implementation of EU-facilitated dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade.9 
In June 2018, EULEX’s mandate was renewed for the fifth and likely final time.10 Many hope 
EULEX will depart soon. The mission has lost executive powers in all but two key areas.11 It 
currently employs only around 500 staff, has withdrawn its executive judges and prosecutors 
(with remaining judges no longer opening new cases besides those affecting Serb-majority 
areas in the north),12 has handed over the vast majority (around 800) of its case files to local 
institutions, and has already begun phasing out its MMA support in anticipation of a complete 
                                                     
5 EULEX Webpage: “Short history of EULEX.” Available at http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,44,197; see also 
Mahr, Ewa (2018). “Local contestation against the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo.” 
Contemporary Security Policy, 39:1, pp. 71-94. 
6 Around 2,000 personnel were international, seconded by EU member states as well as Turkey, Switzerland, 
Norway, Canada and the United States.  
7 European Court of Auditors (2012). European Union Assistant to Kosovo Related to the Rule of Law. Special 
Report No. 18. 
8 EULEX Webpage: “Short history of EULEX.” Available at http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,44,197. 
9 Ibid.  
10 Council of the European Union (2018). “EULEX Kosovo: new role for the EU rule of law mission.” Press Release 
322/18, 8 June. The nine EULEX tasks highlighted in the 2008 Council Joint Action were not explicitly changed 
until June 2018, when the Council decided to formally refocus the mission’s mandate. The current mandate has 
an associated budget of €169.8 million, with nearly €84 million for EULEX operations in Kosovo and €86 million 
for the specialist chambers and the specialist prosecutor’s office.  
11 EULEX maintains executive powers only in the areas of witness protection, support for the specialist chambers 
and prosecutor’s office, and as a second security responder. EULEX’s scope of work is now limited to two key 
pillars – monitoring and operations – in line with the following three objectives: (i) monitoring selected cases and 
trials; (ii) monitoring, mentoring and advising the Kosovo correctional service; and (iii) providing operational 
support for the implementation of EU-facilitated dialogue agreements.11 
12 Bertelsmann Stiftung (2018). BTI 2018 Country Report – Kosovo.  
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withdrawal in June 2020.13 Over the next 18 months, local rule of law institutions will assume 
responsibility for all transferred investigations, prosecutions and trials.14  
EULEX did produce and inspire a number of tangible achievements over the course of a 
decade.15 However, few (including EULEX personnel) would consider EULEX’s legacy to be one 
of success.16 EULEX facilitated the implementation of the EU-facilitated integrated border 
management (IBM) agreement and the establishment and staffing of interim IBM common 
crossing points and permanent crossing points (ongoing).17 EULEX claims to have supported 
Kosovo Customs in adopting new reforms and anti-corruption measures and provided MMA 
support in the areas of compliance, enforcement and revenue collection.18 Moving forward, 
EULEX will limit its MMA support to ‘dialogue-related matters’, particularly IBM 
implementation, “until such time that these responsibilities are transferred to an alternative 
EU mechanism, possibly the EUSR” (EU Special Representative).19  
Positive developments can be attributed to EULEX in the areas of riot control, community and 
intelligence-based policing.20 While mismanagement continues to inhibit the work of the 
Police Inspectorate of Kosovo, and maintaining adequate and representative staffing and 
equipment remains a challenge for Kosovo Police, EULEX no longer provides advisory support 
to the Kosovo Police.21 Even though EULEX claims to have boosted notable improvements in 
                                                     
13 EULEX (2018). Compact Progress Report: Assessing Progress between July 2017 – June 2018; see also Cama, 
Aida (2018). “EU ends Kosovo rule of law mission amid criticism over results.” DW.com, 4 February. 
14 Council of the European Union (2018). “EULEX Kosovo: new role for the EU rule of law mission.” Press Release 
322/18, 8 June. 
15 EULEX legislation experts have contributed to drafting, amending or commenting on 96% of the laws proposed 
by the Ministry of Justice since 2008 and provided legislative assistance to Kosovo authorities on over 150 laws. 
EULEX judges have delivered over 600 verdicts. Special Chamber judges adjudicated over 10,000 property cases. 
EULEX was involved in more than 40,000 court cases and investigated and/or issued indictments in over 400 war 
crimes cases. EULEX facilitated cooperation between Interpol/Europol and Kosovo authorities, leading to 100 
arrests. Alongside the EU, EULEX helped to establish a reliable civil registry of over 12,000 books. EULEX has also 
returned 506 victims to their families since 2008, although over 1,600 persons remain missing. Euractiv and AFP 
(2018). “Criticism as Kosovo justice mission EULEX closes judicial operations.” 11 June; see also EULEX Press 
Office (2018). “EULEX on National Day of Mission Persons – Kosovo People Need Closure to the Painful Loss of 
their Loved Ones.” 27 April; and also Hopkins, Valerie (2017). “EU courts trouble with Kosovo scandal.” Politico, 
17 November. 
16 It is hard to interview a local, international or EU official who can positively assess EULEX achievements. 
Stories of consistent failures are numerous.  
17 EULEX (2018). Compact Progress Report: Assessing Progress between July 2017 – June 2018, p. 35: on the 
Kosovo side, the construction of two of three planned permanent CCPS “advanced despite some technical 
difficulties”, while political problems relating to the relocation of power cables has stalled progress on the third. 
18  EULEX Press Office (2016). “Kosovo Customs marks substantial development towards EU recognized 
standards.” 11 August. 
19 EULEX (2018). Compact Progress Report: Assessing Progress between July 2017 – June 2018, p. 18. 
20 Zupančič, Rok, Nina Pejič, Blaž Grilj, and Annemarie Peen Rodt (2018). “The European Union Rule of Law 
Mission in Kosovo: An Effective Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building Mission?” Journal of Balkan and Near 
Eastern Studies, 20:6, p. 607. 
21 EULEX (2018). Compact Progress Report: Assessing Progress between July 2017 – June 2018. 
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the area of customs and policing, citizens perceive customs to be the most corrupt institution 
and increasingly corrupt.22 Perceptions of corruption within the Kosovo Police have also 
increased (from 15% in October 2017 to 26% in April 2018), although this figure for the 
perception of corruption is still among the lowest compared with other institutions.23 
The progress made in the areas of customs and policing were not mirrored in the justice 
sector, courts, prosecution or overall performance of the judiciary. Yet, EULEX’s executive 
functions did provide for some tangible outputs. The Special Prosecution Office was involved 
in around 1,350 cases, EULEX solved nearly 43,000 property cases via the Property Claims 
Commission, and EULEX judges delivered over 600 verdicts.24 At the same time, EULEX’s 
MMA functions yielded disappointing results. Its key judicial objectives were to support 
increased effectiveness, sustainability, multiethnicity, accountability and independence of the 
judiciary, and compliance with EU best practices. EULEX did support the integration of Kosovo 
Serb judges and prosecutors into the judicial system in 2017, but only after Pristina and 
Belgrade agreed to it.25 Nevertheless, the sustainability, effectiveness, accountability and 
independence of justice sector institutions leave much to be desired.  
EULEX could not counteract political interference in the judiciary, which will remain a key 
challenge moving forward, and sufficient measures for witness protection have not been put 
into place. 26  Capacity and efficiency remain low. Little attention was paid to court 
administration, which remains “slow and inefficient”.27 Staffing the mission with competent 
judges and experienced personnel was also a challenge – it was “difficult to ensure more and 
better judges, since EU member states have proved reluctant or at least faced challenges to 
second a sufficient number of experienced judges in a timely manner. Short-term 
deployments of one year or less usually appeal to younger and less experienced staff.”28 This 
in turn limited the impact of EULEX’s MMA and capacity-building functions. While the 
mission’s support for sustainable reform of the justice sector and judiciary was ‘apparent’, 
EULEX “has been less successful in this field, and rule of law is relatively far from fully 
functioning in Kosovo”.29 
                                                     
22 Among the respondents, 39% considered customs to be corrupt in April 2018, while 25% had perceived 
corruption in customs institutions in October 2017. 
23 UNDP Kosovo (2018). “Public Pulse XIV.” Pristina, June. 
24 Zupančič, Rok, Nina Pejič, Blaž Grilj and Annemarie Peen Rodt (2018). “The European Union Rule of Law 
Mission in Kosovo: An Effective Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building Mission?” Journal of Balkan and Near 
Eastern Studies, 20:6, pp. 599-617. 
25 European Commission (2018). “Kosovo* 2018 Report.” Commission Staff Working Document, SWD (2018) 156 
final, 17 April. 
26 Bertelsmann Stiftung (2018). BTI 2018 Country Report – Kosovo. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Zupančič, Rok, Nina Pejič, Blaž Grilj and Annemarie Peen Rodt (2018). “The European Union Rule of Law 
Mission in Kosovo: An Effective Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building Mission?” Journal of Balkan and Near 
Eastern Studies, 20:6, p. 604. 
29 Ibid., p. 608. 
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According to Bertelsmann Stiftung’s 2018 Transformation Index Report (BTI), the “outcome of 
EULEX anti-corruption endeavors has … been meager; high-ranking corruption cases in 
particular were not even investigated, which creates an impression of impunity”. 30 A former 
international civilian office director attributed this in part to reluctance to challenge the 
political stability. 31 Political considerations influenced EULEX’s choice of cases, time of action 
and tact, and the mission has been accused of being “too involved with local politics and not 
forthcoming enough in prosecuting local political elites”.32 In instances where EULEX did 
choose to pursue high-profile cases, political interference and the inability to collect sufficient 
evidence and witness testimonies (as well as an underdeveloped criminal code) made it 
extremely difficult to prosecute.33 EULEX did arrest a number of high-ranking officials on 
charges of corruption and organised crime, but often failed to deliver convictions in these 
significant high-profile cases.34  
In 2018, EULEX Head of Mission Alexandra Papadopoulou defended shortcomings in this area, 
arguing that EULEX’s primary focus was to “help build rule of law” while “arrests were 
secondary”.35 Still, EULEX’s initial framing and early promises to catch ‘big fish’ reflect poor 
management of local expectations.36 While EULEX’s “effectiveness is based on the attainment 
of its goals … the local actors’ understanding of what those goals are might not be the same 
as that of the EU”. 37 Ultimately, EULEX’s perceived inability to prosecute big fish and to 
combat organised crime and corruption in line with local expectations strengthened 
perceptions of the mission’s ineffectiveness, weakened EULEX’s credibility and “ruined the 
mission’s reputation to the extent that it was broadly, domestically and internationally, seen 
as a failure”.38 It is worth noting that leadership matters. New EULEX chief Papadopoulou, 
with her approach, communication and consistency, has helped improve the image. To many 
locals and internationals, EUSR Nataliya Apostolova and the EULEX chief are the “right people 
                                                     
30 Bertelsmann Stiftung (2018). BTI 2018 Country Report – Kosovo, p. 34. 
31 Capussela, Andrea (2011). “Eulex in Kosovo: a shining symbol of incompetence.” The Guardian, 9 April. 
32 Zupančič, Rok, Nina Pejič, Blaž Grilj and Annemarie Peen Rodt (2018). “The European Union Rule of Law 
Mission in Kosovo: An Effective Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building Mission?” Journal of Balkan and Near 
Eastern Studies, 20:6, p. 608; see also Elbasani (2018). 
33 Papadopoulou cited in Bytyci, Fatos (2018). “EU justice mission leaves Kosovo, accused of failing its mandate.” 
Reuters, 14 June. 
34 Ibid.; see also Kalaja, Besa (2012). “The War against Corruption through Media Spectacles.” Preperotr, 4 
October. 
35 Bytyci, Fatos (2018). “EU justice mission leaves Kosovo, accused of failing its mandate.” Reuters, 14 June. 
36 Mahr, Ewa (2018). “Local contestation against the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo.” 
Contemporary Security Policy, 39:1, pp. 71-94. 
37 Ibid., p. 76. 
38 Ibid., p. 87; see also Bytyci, Fatos (2018). “EU justice mission leaves Kosovo, accused of failing its mandate.” 
Reuters, 14 June. 
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at the wrong time”, arguing that had Papadopoulou been deployed early on in the mission, 
EULEX would have performed much better.39  
Lastly, EULEX itself has faced its fair share of scandal, and corruption within EULEX became a 
controversial issue in the period after 2012.40 While dismissed by an investigation team 
commissioned by the European External Action Service, allegations that high-level EULEX 
officials accepted bribes and the subsequent dismissal of a EULEX prosecutor and 
whistleblower “reinforced a strong impression … that EULEX has become part of the problem 
rather than the solution”.41 EULEX again attracted unwanted headlines in late 2017, when 
Chief Judge Malcolm Simmons resigned amidst “a barrage of claims and counter-claims”.42 In 
addition to these allegations, human resources shortcomings and structural challenges fed a 
domestic narrative in which EULEX, “instead of Europeanizing Kosovo”, had itself been 
“Balkanized”.43 
The short-term, remunerative contracts held by EULEX personnel (often a year or sometimes 
half a year) and consistent turnover also limited EULEX’s effectiveness, as they did not 
accommodate the longer-term nature of prosecutorial and judicial work, limited 
opportunities for knowledge transfer and trust building, and thus “reinforced” its “lack of 
competence”.44 For example, three different EULEX prosecutors have constitutively worked 
on a murder case, each restarting the case, which was only concluded after six years of trial.45 
The EU rule of law mission failed to obtain trust and help local ownership take root. According 
to a member of the Kosovo Supreme Court, a EULEX judge disallowed his professional 
associate to assist him on a case, claiming that the associate was paid to help solely the 
international judge.46 EULEX also demonstrated a “political preference for not upsetting the 
status quo”.47 Whether deriving from the personal/professional interests of EULEX personnel 
or from a tendency by decision-makers in Brussels to “overemphasize stability”, EULEX’s 
                                                     
39 Interviews with government officials, NGOs and diplomats Pristina, September–November 2019.  
40 Mahr, Ewa (2018). “Local contestation against the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo.” 
Contemporary Security Policy, 39:1, pp. 71-94. 
41 Borger, Julian (2014). “EU’s biggest foreign mission in turmoil over corruption row.” The Guardian, 5 
November; see also Borger, Julian (2014). “Maria Bamieh: ‘I learned to adapt and survive’.” The Guardian, 5 
November. 
42 Hopkins, Valerie (2017). “EU courts trouble with Kosovo scandal.” Politico, 17 November. Simmons reported 
pressure to convict Fatmir Limaj in order to prevent him from taking part in the 2017 elections in Kosovo. He 
also highlighted cases of internal corruption and discord within EULEX, claiming that a fellow judge hacked his 
private email, that EULEX was vulnerable to political interference, that one full-time EULEX judge rarely operated 
within Kosovo and another held a second full-time job. 
43 Agron Bajrami quoted in Hopkins, Valerie (2017). “EU courts trouble with Kosovo scandal.” Politico, 17 
November. 
44 Mahr, Ewa (2018). “Local contestation against the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo.” 
Contemporary Security Policy, 39:1, p. 86. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Balkans Policy Research Group (2018). Interview with a Supreme Court judge. Pristina, Kosovo, June.  
47 Euractiv and AFP (2018). “Criticism as Kosovo justice mission EULEX closes judicial operations.” 11 June. 
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demonstrated lack of willingness to rock the boat limited its ability to enact justice and 
substantial judicial reform.48  
EULEX operations in the north “triggered … strong and occasionally violent contestation”.49 
The local court in North Mitrovica refused to cooperate with EULEX when it deployed in 2008, 
and 2011 protests and barricades (in response to the deployment of Kosovo Customs to the 
crossing points in the north) made movement throughout the north nearly impossible.50 
EULEX has failed to investigate and prosecute the killing of its members in north Kosovo in 
2013. Following the Pristina–Belgrade Agreement of April 2013, EULEX has made some 
progress in the north, building a Kosovo Police Regional Command North, integrating Serb 
forces into the Kosovo Police as well as Civil Protection staff into Kosovo structures, and 
presiding over 100 criminal cases in the Mitrovica Basic Court.51  
3. A decade of rule of law and judicial reforms  
The rule of law in Kosovo has seen some improvements in recent years. The Kosovo Judicial 
Council and Kosovo Prosecutorial Council, the oversight bodies responsible for ensuring the 
independence and functioning of the judiciary,52 have overseen an increase in the case 
clearance rate and number of solved cases respectively, and the Kosovo Judicial Council is 
currently in the process of implementing a case management information system in courts 
and prosecution offices. 53  The 2018 Compact Progress Report highlighted increased 
performance and capacity among the Kosovo Police, Kosovo Judicial and Prosecutorial 
Councils, and the Civil Registration Agency in particular.54  
However, the rule of law and judiciary remain weak with major shortcomings in the areas of 
judicial functioning and the fight against organised crime and corruption.55 The judiciary 
continues to struggle with political interference, poor efficiency, accountability, 
                                                     
48 Zupančič, Rok, Nina Pejič, Blaž Grilj and Annemarie Peen Rodt (2018). “The European Union Rule of Law 
Mission in Kosovo: An Effective Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building Mission?” Journal of Balkan and Near 
Eastern Studies, 20:6, pp. 599-617. 
49 Mahr, Ewa (2018). “Local contestation against the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo.” 
Contemporary Security Policy, 39:1, p. 84. 
50 Ibid., pp. 71-94. 
51 Prelec, Marko and Naim Rashiti (2015). “Serb Integration in Kosovo after the Brussels Agreement.” Balkans 
Policy Research Group, 19 March.  
52 The Kosovo Judicial Council and Kosovo Prosecutorial Council are responsible for evaluating and overseeing 
the work of judges and prosecutors, respectively, for establishing standards for recruitment, proposing 
candidates for appointment and managing promotions, transfers, dismissals and disciplinary proceedings. 
53 EULEX (2018). “Joint Rule of Law Coordination Board Compact Progress Report in a Nutshell July 2017 – June 
2018”; see also EULEX Press Office (2018). “Final Meeting of the Joint Rule of Law Coordination Board.” 21 
November. 
54 EULEX (2018). Compact Progress Report: Assessing Progress between July 2017 – June 2018. 
55 European Commission (2018). “Kosovo* 2018 Report.” 17 April. 
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professionalism and public perception.56 In 2016, Kosovo citizens perceived the courts as the 
most corrupt national institution and in 2018 as the second-most corrupt behind Kosovo 
Customs. 57  Prosecutors hesitate to take on high-profile cases, and high-level political 
interference discourages judges from acting independently in sensitive cases.58 The Kosovo 
Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils have failed to improve standards for protecting the 
judiciary from political interference.59  
The training, education and skills of both prosecutors and judges are inadequate in most 
cases. In February 2017, the Kosovo Judicial Institute was replaced by the Academy of Justice, 
responsible for the initial and continuous training of judges, prosecutors and their staff in line 
with criteria prepared in cooperation with the Kosovo Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils.60 
While the Kosovo Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils are required to conduct performance 
evaluations for prosecutors and judges every three years, performance assessments have met 
with long delays, and those have been largely superficial.61  
A key challenge for the justice system is the backlog of cases.62 A high number of incoming 
cases, the new Law on Minor Offences (which took effect in January 2017), the lack of 
financing for and familiarity with dispute resolution tools and mediation have all contributed 
to the lack of progress in clearing court backlogs.63 As part of the reduction strategy, the 
Kosovo Judicial Council is responsible for recruiting associates to assist judges in resolving 
cases efficiently, but it lacks a budget to make use of, according to the Kosovo Democratic 
                                                     
56 Ibid.  
57 UNDP Kosovo (2016). “Public Pulse XI.” May, and UNDP Kosovo (2018). “Public Pulse XIV”. The percentage of 
Public Pulse respondents who perceived large-scale corruption in courts more than doubled from 2016 to 2018. 
June; see also Schulte-Cloos and Elshani (2016), p. 10: “Nine out of ten individuals (89.97%) evaluate that people 
with political influence are less likely to face legal consequences whereas only less than one out of ten (9.57%) 
believe that they are not.” 
58 EULEX (2014). Letter from EULEX Judges to the Head of Executive Division, Mats Mattsson, 22 January; see 
also UNDP and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2014). “Judicial Integrity in Kosovo – Assessment 
Report”; and also Bertelsmann Stiftung (2018). BTI 2018 Country Report – Kosovo. 
59 European Commission (2018). “Kosovo* 2018 Report.” 17 April. In 2018, the EU recommended that the 
Kosovo Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils “establish a mechanism to react more efficiently and actively in cases 
of alleged political interference in the judiciary”. 
60 European Commission (2018). “Kosovo* 2018 Report.” 17 April.  
61 Ibid.  
62 Ibid. See Bertelsmann Stiftung (2018). BTI 2018 Country Report – Kosovo. While the number of impending 
cases reduced from 466,255 in 2013 to 440,627 by the beginning of 2016, court backlogs remain a key 
challenge. See also USAID (2015). “Kosovo Courts Reduce Backlog of Cases”. USAID calculations estimated that 
there were 56,300 major criminal, civil and serious crime cases in Kosovo’s 7 basic courts and their 20 
corresponding branch courts in July 2014. 
63 European Commission (2018). “Kosovo* 2018 Report.” 17 April. Alternative dispute resolution and mediation 
systems could help reduce the backlog of cases and number of incoming cases; however, the public is largely 
unaware of these mechanisms, and three of seven regional mediation centres have closed due to lack of 
funding. 
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Institute.64 Other factors include shortcomings in criminal legislation,65 the absence of a 
centralised criminal records registry,66 the low commitment of judges to sanction those 
causing delays, lengthy postponements of hearings (officials hardly show up in court), a high 
rate of cases sent to the basic courts for retrial, a demonstrated “preference for detention 
over other restrictive measures”, and the understaffing of courts and prosecution offices.67   
Satisfaction with the judiciary is low. In April 2018, a Public Pulse Poll conducted by the UN 
Development Programme (UNDP) and US Agency for International Development (USAID) 
reported that only 31.2% of respondents were satisfied with the courts and 29.9% were 
satisfied with the prosecutor’s office, the lowest level for any central executive or legislative 
institution in Kosovo.68  
The European Commission finds the composition and appointment procedures of the Kosovo 
Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils to be in line with European standards on paper, but these 
management bodies have failed to prompt substantial improvement, uphold internal 
regulations or enact the legal provisions needed to measure and ensure the accountability 
and efficiency of the judicial and prosecutorial systems.69 Additionally, the EU finds that the 
Kosovo Judicial Council does not have the capacity to create the conditions for implementing 
the legislation.70  
In 2010, 76% of the Kosovo population believed that the EU integration process would help 
Kosovo fight corruption.71 Yet, nearly a decade later, citizens consider corruption to be the 
second-most paramount issue Kosovo is facing, behind unemployment.72 Against the high 
hopes that EULEX would dismantle criminal networks and prosecute high-level corrupt 
officials and elites, corruption and organised crime are still pervasive at all levels of 
government and a culture of impunity prevails. The 2018 EU country report for Kosovo cited 
some progress in the areas of final convictions for high-level corruption and organised crime 
cases and of preliminary confiscation of assets (although not with regard to final confiscation), 
but progress has been slow and largely superficial.73  
                                                     
64  Center for International Legal Cooperation (CILC), FOL Movement, and Kosova Democratic Institute 
(KDI)/Transparency International (2017). “Kosovo Justice Sector Integrity Scan.” December. 
65 European Commission (2018). “Kosovo* 2018 Report.” 17 April; the EU recommends that many provisions of 
the Criminal Procedure Code be simplified. See also Bertelsmann Stiftung (2018). BTI 2018 Country Report – 
Kosovo. 
66 Bertelsmann Stiftung (2018). BTI 2018 Country Report – Kosovo. 
67 European Commission (2018). “Kosovo* 2018 Report.” 17 April. 
68 UNDP Kosovo (2018). “Public Pulse XIV.” Pristina, June. 
69 European Commission (2018). “Kosovo* 2018 Report.” 17 April. 
70 Ibid. 
71 UBO Consulting 2012 in Mahr, Ewa (2018). “Local contestation against the European Union Rule of Law 
Mission in Kosovo.” Contemporary Security Policy, 39:1, pp. 71-94. 
72 UNDP Kosovo (2018). “Public Pulse XIV.” Pristina, June. 
73 European Commission (2018). “Kosovo* 2018 Report.” 17 April. 
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In 2015, a multidisciplinary team comprised of representatives from local rule of law 
institutions and tasked with coordinating efforts against high-level corruption and organised 
crime was established. This team led 42 investigations, resulting in 31 indictments but only 7 
convictions.74 Similarly, preliminary confiscation of assets has increased but final asset 
confiscation remains low, at only around 17% of those assets initially frozen and seized.75 The 
EU is urging Kosovo to make substantial effort throughout 2019 with regard to final 
convictions and confiscation of assets in organised crime and money laundering cases.76 
Elites continue to evade prosecution and conviction. The judiciary has demonstrated little 
willingness to prosecute high-level cases of organised crime and corruption. 77  When 
prosecutions do occur, they are undermined by political interference and low capacity for 
managing high-level corruption cases. Kosovo urgently needs to focus on increasing the 
number of prosecutors investigating and prosecuting high-level corruption cases and 
increasing capacity in the areas of financial investigations, asset confiscation and witness 
protection.78 
Anti-corruption institutions are poorly coordinated, and have complex and overlapping 
mandates.79 Bertelsmann Stiftung’s BTI report of 2018 states that “the fact that a variety of 
institutions (e.g. the office of the state prosecutor, the anti-corruption task force, the office of 
the auditor general and also EULEX) are involved in fighting corruption has only resulted in 
spending without a coherent strategy”.80 Furthermore, anti-corruption efforts rarely go 
“beyond political statements”. 81 Assembly oversight over anti-corruption agencies has been 
impaired by “ongoing clashes between political parties”, suggesting that the political party 
landscape inhibits anti-corruption efforts not only because of backroom deals and party 
cronyism but also because inter-party dynamics prevent proper oversight.82 Moreover, the 
report suggests that anti-corruption institutions in Kosovo have befallen a fate similar to that 
of other public institutions in Kosovo and the Western Balkans – one of fragmentation and 
‘agencification’.83 
                                                     
74 Ibid. 
75 During the reporting period for the EU’s 2018 country report. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Group for Legal and Political Studies (2018). “Nations in Transit 2018 – Kosovo Report.” Freedom House. 
78 European Commission (2018). “Kosovo* 2018 Report.” 17 April. 
79 Freedom House (2018). Freedom in the World 2018 – Kosovo Profile. 
80 Bertelsmann Stiftung (2018). BTI 2018 Country Report – Kosovo, p. 34. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Mendelski, Martin (2018). “Good Governance Promotion in the Western Balkans: An Empirical Analysis of the 
De-politicization and Fragmentation of the State.” Conference Papers: Rule of Law in the Western Balkans: 
Exploring the New EU Enlargement Strategy and Necessary Steps Ahead. Aspen Institute Germany, April. 
Mendelski argues that externally-driven good governance reform and efforts to de-politicise public institutions 
have resulted in fragmentation and ‘agencification’. Indeed, in Kosovo, the number of semi-autonomous 
agencies has grown by over 400% since 1999.  
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Kosovo improved in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, from place 
number 33 in 2016 to 39 in 2017.84 While this score may reflect slight developments in the 
fight against organised crime and corruption, public perception of corruption is increasing. 
According to the UNDP’s annual Public Pulse survey, the proportion of respondents perceiving 
large-scale corruption in a variety of national and international institutions increased from 
2017 to 2018 for every institution in question.85  
3.1 Many ongoing rule of law initiatives, scattered among locals and internationals  
The Kosovo authorities had launched several initiatives with the aim of improving 
coordination and performance on the rule of law. Yet, the results remain highly questionable 
and are challenged by wider distrust.  
In November 2016, the Ministry of Justice launched the Functional Review of the Rule of Law 
Sector, a ministry-led process seeking to advance the rule of law in line with EU standards. 86 
The ministry committed to conducting a comprehensive assessment of the rule of law in 
Kosovo, which can inform the development of a comprehensive strategy for the rule of law 
that will help “harmonize the principles, legislation and institutions responsible in this 
sector”.87 Streamlining rule of law processes should be a high priority for the government, 
given the ad hoc, decentralised nature of reforms and initiatives in recent years. 
Unfortunately, the functional review process was delayed for numerous reasons driven by 
repeated government crises and a lack of political will. It was relaunched in March 2018 with 
alternative plans for the composition of the steering committee.88 The first comprehensive 
report will come out sometime in 2019 and aims to identify fundamental gaps within the rule 
of law sector and wide-ranging interventions and reforms to be implemented over a number 
of years.89 
                                                     
84 Transparency International (2016). “Fighting Corruption in the EU Accession Countries in the Western Balkans 
and Turkey.” 10 November; see also Euractiv and AFP (2018). “Criticism as Kosovo justice mission EULEX closes 
judicial operations.” 11 June. 
85 UNDP Kosovo (2018). “Public Pulse XIV.” Pristina, June. Perceptions of the prevalence of large-scale corruption 
in rule of law and key governing institutions in Kosovo are as follows: courts (38.6%, up from 24.9% in October 
2017 but substantially lower than the rates reported during 2010–2016 excluding April 2011), Customs (39.1%, 
up from 22.7% in October 2017), central administration/government (34.7%), Privatization Agency of Kosovo 
(34.5%), EULEX Police (29.9%, up from 20.9% in October 2017), Tax Administration of Kosovo (28.9%) and 
Kosovo Police (25.7%, up from 14.9% in October 2017).  
86 Matias, Barbara and Francisco Jose Garcia Martinez (2018). “The Functional Review of the Kosovar Justice 
system: an overview of the process so far.” Group for Legal and Political Studies. 
87 GazettaExpress (2018). “Kosovo Launches Functional Review of the Rule of Law Sector.” 9 March. 
88 Matias, Barbara and Francisco Jose Garcia Martinez (2018). “The Functional Review of the Kosovar Justice 
system: an overview of the process so far.” Group for Legal and Political Studies; see also GazettaExpress (2018). 
“Kosovo Launches Functional Review of the Rule of Law Sector.” 9 March. 
89 Balkans Policy Research Group (2018). Interview with Kosovo Government Official. Pristina, Kosovo, 20 
December.  
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While working on the Functional Review, the same ministry launched a new agenda, Justice 
2020, which focuses primarily on the judicial and prosecutorial system, and will serve as a 
coordinating mechanism and complement the Functional Review Process “by establishing 
opportunities for discussing major topics that require in-depth research and more detailed 
discussions within the working groups”.90 The Justice 2020 initiative, headed by the minister 
of justice in cooperation with the chairs of the Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils, is 
presented as a significant step for the independent functioning of Kosovo’s rule of law 
institutions and gives some hope that local ownership of the rule of law and judicial reform 
processes will grow and mature as EULEX takes a step back. 91 Although supported financially 
by the US, UK and EU, Justice 2020 was “established proactively at the initiative of Kosovo 
authorities” and drafted independently by Kosovo institutions.92 There is nonetheless very 
little on paper and the agenda is not publicly available. The agenda is expected to set short-
term priorities, particularly those that can enhance judicial efficiency, in line with the results 
deriving from the Functional Review.93 
As it stands, Kosovo still “lacks a comprehensive strategy for justice sector reforms and a 
proper mechanism for inter-institutional coordination”.94 The Functional Review process and 
Justice 2020 could fill some of these gaps. These two initiatives demonstrate the Ministry of 
Justice’s intention to focus on improving coordination and streamlining rule of law reform in 
the coming years and could serve as foundational platforms to increase local ownership of the 
rule of law in Kosovo’s post-EULEX landscape. However, there are two problems: there is not 
full political will to back reforms and the Ministry of Justice should be wary of launching 
sweeping initiatives or new programmes quickly out of the gate. Initiatives, which further 
decentralise rather than coordinate existing institutions and processes, could increase 
opportunities for mismanagement rather than streamline rule of law and judicial reform.  
In the case of Kosovo, the international community and donors exclusively have driven 
reforms and legislative agendas until now. Recent local initiatives mark the beginning but the 
government has neither the will nor the capacity to drive the reform agenda alone. The role 
of the EU and other donors is deeply rooted in the Kosovo system and much of the progress 
made comes from their contributions. But from the citizens’ point of view they also share the 
blame for things that did not go well.  
                                                     
90 Minister of Justice Tahiri quoted in EULEX Press Office (2018). “Final Meeting of the Joint Rule of Law 
Coordination Board.” 21 November. 
91 EULEX Head of Mission Alexandra Papadopoulou quoted in EULEX Press Office (2018). “EULEX at the launch of 
Justice 2020.” 26 September. 
92 Papadopoulou quoted in ibid. 
93 Balkans Policy Research Group (2018). Personal Interview. Pristina, Kosovo, 5 December. 
94 European Commission (2018). “Kosovo* 2018 Report.” 17 April, p. 14. 
14 | NAIM RASHITI 
 
3.2 EU and international support for the rule of law in Kosovo 
Insufficient interinstitutional coordination is not unique to local institutions, as the 2018 
country report for Kosovo also cited lack of coordination among donors resulting in 
“inefficiencies, incoherence and duplication of efforts”. 95 In addition to the EU, which 
currently funds around 20 rule of law-related projects, are other donors funding such projects 
in Kosovo, as discussed below.  
The UNDP focuses on three areas: (i) strategic planning, policy development and coordination 
in the area of rule of law; (ii) the institutional capacity of judicial institutions and career 
development of legal actors; and (iii) access to justice and justice service delivery.96 The rule 
of law activities of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe focus on 
supporting the independence, impartiality and accountability of the justice system, 
monitoring and reporting on the judiciary and prosecution, the administration of justice in 
interethnic cases and cases impacting women and marginalised communities, and reviewing 
and supporting institutions to both develop and implement legislation.97 
USAID projects support judicial independence, the implementation of laws, oversight, 
management and professional skills (primarily within the Kosovo Judicial Council, Kosovo 
Judicial Academy, and courts) and efforts to combat pervasive corruption, as well as 
commercial law, property rights and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.98 Specific 
projects include ‘Justice Matters’, a three-year activity to improve access to justice, and the 
‘Justice System Strengthening Program’. ICITAP, the US Department of Justice’s International 
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, leads coordination for police development 
and currently assists the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Kosovo Police particularly in the areas 
of border management and immigration, IT support for criminal investigations, police and 
prosecutorial management of organised and financial crimes.99 
Norway committed to fully funding the development of a case management information 
system in courts and prosecution offices, and has been a key supporter of using alternative 
dispute resolution methods and of the CSSP (Berlin Center for Integrative Mediation) project 
for Kosovo since 2012.100 
                                                     
95 Ibid. 
96  UNDP Kosovo Project Website: “Support to strengthening the rule of law in Kosovo.” Available at 
http://www.ks.undp.org/content/kosovo/en/home/operations/projects/democratic_governance/support-to-
strengthening-the-rule-of-law-in-kosovo.html. 
97 Ibid.  
98  USAID (2018). Webpage: “Rule of Law and Governance.” Last updated February. Available at 
https://www.usaid.gov/kosovo/democracy-and-governance. 
99 The United States Department of Justice. Webpage: “International Criminal Investigations Program (ICITAP): 
Europe and Eurasia.” Available at https://www.justice.gov/criminal-icitap/europe-and-eurasia. 
100 The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2017). “Statement by the Royal Norwegian Ambassador, Mr. Per 
Strand Sjaastad.” Support for Strengthening the Rule of Law in Kosovo – Information campaign on Mediation, 
March. 
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Other projects come from the Netherlands government, Millennium Challenge Cooperation, 
GIZ, etc.  
EU operations in Kosovo are diverse and far-reaching. EU institutions in Brussels and those 
operating within the country (the EUSR and EULEX) have developed and implemented a 
variety of mechanisms, instruments, funding schemes, processes and action plans to support 
Kosovo’s development and democratisation in line with European norms and to aid Kosovo on 
its path towards European integration. The European Reform Agenda, Stabilisation and 
Association Process, and EU enlargement perspective for the Western Balkans all demand 
substantial reforms in the area of rule of law as preconditions for further EU integration and 
accession.  
The SAP, the EU’s framework for relations with Western Balkan countries and the EU’s 
enlargement perspective for the region, is a key pillar of the EU agenda in Kosovo. Kosovo has 
engaged in the SAP since 2010, and a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between 
Kosovo and the EU entered into force in April 2016 with support for the efforts of Kosovo to 
strengthen democracy and the rule of law as one of four key aims of association.101 Kosovo’s 
ERA was adopted in 2016 and set short-term priorities through the end of 2017 in line with 
SAA-related requirements, with one of three key focus areas being good governance and rule 
of law.102 While the timeline for the ERA one has expired, a key requirement that is still 
needed in the “legislative domain is the swift adoption of the provisions concerning the 
suspension and removal of public officials respectively indicted and convicted for 
corruption”.103 Although an ERA II is expected, plans have not yet been formally announced.  
As EULEX is phased out and its monitoring, mentoring and advising support withdrawn from a 
number of institutions,104 the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) II will take on 
additional importance as a key mechanism for rule of law promotion and judicial reform in 
Kosovo. More specifically, “alternative assistance tools” (including IPA funds and projects) will 
be used to fill the “institutional gaps and structural weaknesses” that remain.105  
                                                     
101 Council of the European Union (2015). Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Union 
and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the One Part, and Kosovo*, of the Other Part, 2 October. Article 
83 of the SAA (Reinforcement of institutions and rule of law) highlights the following key aims: strengthening the 
independence, impartiality, accountability and efficiency of the judiciary; developing “adequate structures” for 
the police, prosecutors, judges, and all judicial and law enforcement bodies to “adequately prepare them for 
cooperation in civil, commercial and criminal matters”; and, “to enable them to effectively prevent, investigate, 
prosecute and adjudicate organized crime, corruption, and terrorism”. 
102 Balkans Policy Research Group (2017). “European Reform Agenda: Progress Report on Good Governance and 
Rule of Law.” 26 October. 
103 EUSR Nataliya Apostolova in EULEX Press Office (2018). “Final Meeting of the Joint Rule of Law Coordination 
Board.” 21 November. 
104 Including the Kosovo Police, the Kosovo Judicial Council, the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council, and the Civil 
Registration Agency. 
105 EULEX (2018). Compact Progress Report: Assessing Progress between July 2017 – June 2018, p. 2. 
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The government of Kosovo implemented the 95 priority actions identified through the 
dialogue on visa liberalisation. The visa dialogue itself was a high priority for the government 
and its constituents and has been closely linked with rule of law reform, specifically the fight 
against organised crime and corruption. In July 2018, the European Commission announced 
that Kosovo had met the required benchmarks; the European Parliament and Council must 
still approve the proposal on visa liberalisation for Kosovo.106 
The EUSR’s Rule of Law and Legal Section collaborates with EULEX on a number of initiatives, 
including capacity building of local institutions, judicial cooperation between local and 
international institutions, and implementation of the Legislation Review Mechanism. The 
latter provides the government and Assembly of Kosovo with advice on EU acquis standards 
relevant to the government’s legislative programme and benchmarks outlined in EU 
alignment processes including the SAP, visa liberalisation and EU-facilitated dialogue with 
Serbia.107 
The European Commission released its most recent Communication on a credible 
enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU enlargement with the Western Balkans in 
February 2018. The Commission highlights that all Western Balkan states need to take 
immediate action to ensure the independence and efficiency of judicial systems, to 
implement frameworks for preventing corruption, to counter money laundering and 
organised crime,108 as well as to further invest in processes of transitional justice.109 In the 
2018 enlargement strategy, the EU introduced six new flagship initiatives, the first being the 
initiative to strengthen the rule of law. With the newly-announced rule of law flagship 
initiative, the EU will expand upon existing tools (including detailed action plans), enhance its 
assessment of reform implementation through new impact indicators, trial monitoring and 
case-based peer-review missions, and introduce new rule of law advisory missions.110 
One element of the enlargement strategy is not regionally applicable – that relating to 
Kosovo–Serbia relations. While reaffirming the European perspective of all states in the 
Western Balkans, the EU has issued a thinly veiled reference to Kosovo’s status-related 
                                                     
106 European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs. Webpage: “Visa Liberalisation: Commission confirms 
Kosovo fulfils all required benchmarks.” Available at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/visa-liberalisation-
commission-confirms-kosovo-fulfils-all-required-benchmarks_en. 
107  European Union Office in Kosovo. Webpage: “Kosovo* and the EU.” Available at 
https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/1387/kosovo-and-eu_en. 
108 Via dismantling criminal networks and their economic bases, using financial investigations and tools 
(precautionary asset-freezing, a reversed burden of proof for specific types of assets, and more stringent 
disclosure requirements for businesses, among others). See European Commission (2018). “Enlargement 
Perspective.” February. 
109 For Kosovo, this includes the handling of war crimes cases and full cooperation with the Kosovo Specialist 
Chambers. See European Commission (2018). “A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU 
engagement with the Western Balkans.” Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2018) 65 final, 
6 February. 
110 Ibid. 
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challenges, noting Kosovo’s opportunity to advance on its European path only “once objective 
circumstances allow”.111 A comprehensive, legally-binding normalisation agreement between 
Serbia and Kosovo must be concluded in order for either to advance on their respective 
European paths (and must be “irreversibl[y] implement[ed]” before accession negotiations 
with Serbia can be closed).112  
4. Looking forward 
In the 2018 credible enlargement perspective for the Western Balkans, the EU committed to 
support the transformation of Western Balkan states through six new flagship initiatives, the 
most important being the initiative to strengthen the rule of law. With EULEX winding down, 
plans for the EU’s new flagship rule of law initiative and advisory mission in Kosovo will take 
on increasing significance. EU rule of law engagement in the Western Balkans, in terms of the 
shape, role, precise aims and level of support planned, has only been very broadly defined. As 
outlined in the enlargement strategy, the European Commission plans to expand upon 
existing tools (including detailed action plans), enhance its assessment of reform 
implementation through new impact indicators, and provide support via trial monitoring, case-
based peer-review missions and new advisory missions.113 The EU has also committed to 
continuing support for the work of the International Criminal Tribunals and the Kosovo 
Specialist Chambers.114  
The final declaration of the 2018 EU–Western Balkans Summit included the ‘Sofia Priority 
Agenda’, which offers minor additional insights. 115 While also envisaging the introduction of 
trial monitoring (in the field of serious corruption and organised crime), advisory missions 
“with increased support from Member States and the EU”, and systematic, case-based peer-
review missions focused on monitoring reforms, it has highlighted the EU’s intention to 
“enhance support for judicial reform and efforts to fight corruption and organised crime 
including capacity building for corruption prevention” and support for better measurement of 
results in justice reform.116 
The EU will increasingly and solely rely on the IPA as the primary framework through which 
programmatic and financial support is provided to Western Balkan states in line with the 
enlargement strategy – “in order to ensure adequate funding to support this [enlargement] 
                                                     
111 Ibid., p. 2. 
112 Ibid., p. 2. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Developed by the EU and member states, in consultation with Western Balkan partners, at the EU–Western 
Balkans Summit in May 2018. 
116 Council of the European Union (2018). “Sofia Declaration.” EU–Western Balkans Summit, Sofia, 17 May 2018. 
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strategy and a seamless transition to membership, the Commission proposes to gradually 
increase funding under the [IPA]”.117  
There are over 20 ongoing EU-funded projects supporting fundamental rights and the rule of 
law in Kosovo. However, a major justice package will likely be unveiled in 2019. A multi-year, 
comprehensive programme to support the rule of law in Kosovo is currently in the planning 
stages. This programme, which may be modelled loosely upon the EURALIUS project 
implemented in Albania, 118 will be largely funded through the IPA and will focus on 
defragmenting rule of law development support and facilitating cohesive sectorial rule of law 
reform in Kosovo. The funding and implementation of this programme is expected to be 
primarily channelled through the Ministry of Justice and, to a lesser extent, through the 
Kosovo Prosecutorial and Judicial Councils, as well as the Justice Academy. The programme is 
expected to concentrate broadly on three key areas: (i) sectorial management and 
monitoring, (ii) capacity building and implementation of legal frameworks, and (iii) access to 
justice. Moving forward, the EU also foresees increased focus on twinning actions as well as 
increased cooperation with USAID and member state donors in an effort to minimise overlap 
and to better coordinate the division of labour and programming among international donors 
in Kosovo.  
4.1 Rule of law flagship initiatives: A need for fresh and concrete actions 
The European Commission has to yet release specific plans and agendas for the rule of law 
flagship initiatives in terms of their structure, size or scope. Preliminary discussions reveal 
some of the challenges. The government of Kosovo is not showing any commitment yet and 
there is a difference of view between the local authorities and EU representatives. This 
threatens the good intentions of the initiatives. An EU official warned that because of a lack of 
will on the EU side to offer more to Kosovo and on the government side to genuinely 
implement reforms, the new flagship initiatives could end up being a repackaging of the 
ongoing projects under a different title.119  
Ideally, the EU should deploy a ‘PRIEBE’ mission to Kosovo, whose task should be to 
comprehensively evaluate the functioning and performance of the rule of law.120 The PRIEBE 
mission was named after Reinhard Priebe, a German expert and former EU official, who 
chaired the Senior Experts' Group on systemic rule of law issues in the Former Yugoslav 
                                                     
117 European Commission (2018). “A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with 
the Western Balkans.” 6 February, p. 18. 
118 For more, see https://euralius.eu/en/. 
119 Interview with EU officials, January 2019, Pristina.  
120 European Commission (2015). “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Recommendations of Senior 
Experts’ Group on systemic Rule of Law issues relating to the communications interception revealed in Spring 
2015.” Brussels, 8 June.  
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Republic of Macedonia.121 An EU official warned that the “EU can launch such a review 
mission only if it has to offer something in return … I am afraid it has nothing to offer.”122  
In spite of the painful realities, the EU should seize the opportunity of the credible 
enlargement strategy for the Western Balkans to launch a much more robust rule of law 
agenda for Kosovo (and the Western Balkans). At the same time, Kosovo’s authorities should 
seek concrete actions and plans that will comprehensively address the deficiencies of the rule 
of law. Citizens who have lost faith in both their government and the EU want a different plan 
that makes change real and brings tangible benefits to the people.  
To achieve this, certain principles need to be set from the outset before any new flagship 
initiative takes shape:  
1. EULEX should go home. Any new action and initiative should not take into account any 
role for the mission or the personnel.  
2. Launch an independent verification & evaluation mission. Before any new initiative, the 
EU needs to launch a PRIEBE-like mission to Kosovo to independently and fairly evaluate 
the state of the rule of law, the achievements of EULEX and ongoing projects. The 
experts will identify gaps and the actions to be taken, which need to be presented in 
simple, actionable language. The report should become a manual for reforms and serve 
as a baseline for any new initiative to be launched.  
3. Ensure projects are demand-driven with full local ownership. Any new initiative should 
be of a demand-driven form with the Kosovo authorities and in close consultation with 
civil society and other stakeholders. Likewise, all reform agendas need to have the local 
authorities in the driving seat. Citizens want local authorities to be accountable.  
4. Provide for inclusive planning based on a fact-funding mission, consultations and 
inclusion. The government is prone to designing plans and projects on its own. So too 
are the EU institutions. Both like to do their planning alone. The credibility of both is 
heavily undermined and public trust that the government or the EU will do any better 
work on the rule of law is very low. To increase the chance of success, the new 
initiatives should earn much broader support, with the goal to increase support for 
reforms from the bottom up.  
5. Any mission support within the country needs to have a well-defined list of tasks, scope 
and size, which aims to implement priorities but does not challenge local ownership. 
With EULEX’s tarnished image, any new mission must absolutely differentiate itself from 
a EULEX-type mission or some of the twinning projects that have also been weak.  
                                                     
121  Erwan Fouéré (2016). “Europe Must Be Ready to Punish Macedonia’s Leaders.” Balkan Insight, 22 April. All 
Western Balkan countries need “Priebe Reports” to measure state capture – see the full report at 
http://www.bezbednost.org/. 
122 Interview with an EU official, October 2018, Brussels.  
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6. Streamline reform processes. The assessment report and the new initiatives should help 
to streamline reform processes and increase the performance of rule of law institutions. 
While supporting the reform agenda, peer-to-peer review and a sectorial approach with 
semi-permanent projects and personnel in the country should engage in the sectorial 
areas with clear tasks. Those missions need to regularly report to the wider public.  
7. Temper expectations. Framing expectations will be key to any new EU rule of law 
initiative or mission in Kosovo. Local perceptions of EULEX’s ineffectiveness derived in 
part from unrealistic expectations, which EULEX did little to temper. The EU and local 
authorities should commit to achieving targeted, realistic benchmarks, and the 
responsibilities of EU personnel and local authorities should be clearly delineated. As 
demonstrated via EULEX, unkept promises are harshly judged in the court of public 
opinion, which can affect the perceived authority of mission personnel and the overall 
effectiveness of development support for the rule of law and judicial reform.  
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